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Why Did Churchill Have Britain Fight On After Summer 1940? It’s Bad News.
Why Did Churchill
Have Britain Fight On After Summer 1940?
It’s Bad News.
Patrick Cleburne • The Unz Review • December 20, 2024 • 6,400 Words • Has Comments
Republished from The Occidental Observer by permission of author or representative
Lady Randolph with her two sons, John and Winston, 1889.
In the high summer of 1940, the politicians who comprised the British Government faced a terrible and momentous problem.
So, on a personal level, did the new British Prime Minister from May 10th, Winston Churchill. More on this later.
At the time, the British Empire is often said to have ruled a quarter of the land surface of the world and upon which the sun never set. It had an appropriate navy. The white Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were expected to follow Britain’s lead, and indeed did.
It was a world power.
To everyone’s astonishment, the outbreak of war with Germany in September 1939 had not deadlocked in the static trench warfare of the Western Front in World War I (1914–1918).
Instead, the Germans, starting in April 1940, conquered Norway and Denmark, and then went on to conquer the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Most of the British Army was extricated from France via Dunkirk, but without much heavy equipment.
This admittedly was a stunning emotional blow to Britain’s elite, quite a few of whom (unlike their American counterparts) had fought on the Western Front in World War I and where many of whom had lost relatives.
Britain by the middle of the twentieth Century had had tremendous experience in fighting wars, in an astonishing number of countries (Wikipedia reckons 171). Quite a few of these had been unsuccessful. sometimes humiliatingly so — most notably of course the American War of Independence.
War, to the British, was a business. They were not Crusades. Sometimes you won, sometimes you lost. Then you moved on.
What was so different about 1940?
Operation Sea Lion (the German sea crossing to England) was of course in planning. But it was pro forma. It is clear from the literature that the German Navy — the Kriegsmarine — always said it could not protect cross channel transports from devastating attacks from the then enormous Royal Navy. The Luftwaffe was also not optimistic.
This must also have been the assessment of the British military (never, as far as I know, ever disclosed).
Paradoxically, Britain was probably in a less dangerous position in 1940 than during the several years in the early nineteenth century during which Napoleon controlled the Continent and threatened invasion .
The internal combustion engine had allowed air raids on England, distressing — but with no possibility of being decisive. However it also eliminated the ghastly chance that unfavorable winds would prevent the Royal Navy attacking vulnerable invading vessels. Wind had been a critical element of risk in previous crises. The two most significant successful invasions — William the Conqueror’s in 1066 and William III’s in 1688 — had been able to avoid defending warships because of the chance of wind.
What the British Government had to consider in 1940 was: Why fight on?
Britain had always been against an excessively powerful Continental entity. But this had now happened.
Britain had also in recent centuries become extremely concerned to protect its extensive overseas assets — the British Empire. France had usually been the threat to this — and so, around the turn of the twentieth century, had been Imperial Germany.
But Hitler’s Germany was not a threat. Archival evidence proves that Hitler was absolutely opposed to destroying the British Empire which he saw as a congenial component of an ideal world order. Instead, he was completely focused on the geopolitical threat from the Soviet Russia. This was known at the time.
The geopolitical threat from the Soviet Union was also — or should have been — as great a concern to the British. They had actually borne the brunt of Soviet subversion efforts in their Empire during the interwar years. National Socialism had little intrinsic appeal to the British people, oblivious as they were to the threats and problems which engendered it. But this was far from true with Communism and Socialism. Varieties of these had struck deep roots in British society. The scandalous post-war espionage revelations of the ‘Cambridge Five’ were probably just a hint of the reality.
In August 1940, Britain simply had no path to military victory. During World War I there was always the hope that the next offensive would break through (which indeed did happen in late 1918). France was never knocked out of the war. Fighting on in World War I may not have been sensible, but it was not irrational.
In 1940 this hope was gone. The idea that Britain by itself had any chance of subduing Germany in a continental land war was clearly ridiculous.
There was the alternative of seducing other countries into the war, as with America in 1917.
Experience had proved this was a highly unattractive option. America had brought much strength but little wisdom into World War I, insisting on imposing an unstable redrawing of the European map and creating dangerous problems. Furthermore she had proved a merciless and irresponsible creditor for much of the next two decades.
The fact was that the American elite was endemically Anglophobic and anti-imperialist. They were jealous of the British Empire. Confusingly this was disguised somewhat by often very pleasant interpersonal relationships. And this was before one considered the increasing influence of the tedious Irish and the newly arrived Russian Jews.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union was a flat-out proven danger. Beyond their incessant promotion of their antithetical and blood-soaked doctrines between the wars, the Russians under Stalin’s highly enterprising leadership had made war certain in 1939. By concluding the Ribbentrop Molotov Pact on August 23, 1939, they freed Hitler’s hand in Western Europe. They went on to bolster Germany by supplying large new quantities of raw materials. Even worse, the Soviet seizure of the Baltic States, a large slice of Poland, part of Romania, and a (dearly-bought) fragment of Finland removed all doubt that the USSR was additionally an aggressive predatory power in the old style.
Putting Britain at the mercy of these dangerous parties was not obviously more attractive than coming to an agreement with Germany.
However, before Winston Churchill who became Prime Minister on May 10, 1940, could think about this problem, he had a more pressing crisis to weather.
He was about to become insolvent, which would have forced his retirement from Parliament.
Churchill’s return to office in September 1939 had destabilized his always precarious finances. He could no longer hope to complete various lucrative writing deals on which he had counted. Income taxes, interest on bank loans and many personal debts were falling due at the month end. He did not have the cash to pay them.
As recounted in the extraordinary 2015 book “No More Champagne: Churchill and His Money” by David Lough, Churchill was rescued by a GBP 5,000 check from Sir Henry Strakosch, arranged by Churchill’s ‘fixer’ Brendan Bracken. At the time Bracken was co-owner with Strakosch of the famous magazine “The Economist”. (Derived from Lough’s figures, this would be about GBP 347,000 or some $410,000 today).
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